November 13, 2005

• Intriguing and thought-provoking stuff - I am woefully ignorant of Western classical philosophy and had never heard of Pyrrho of Elis. That link makes him sound like a proto-multi-culturalist. Also set me thinking on the distiction between the schools of skepticism, which I didn't find clear from Chy's link but is touched on in this long article at the IEP which I made it through a bit of.
• And if we're doing philosophy links, you might find this page at foucault.info mildly amusing
• Sticking to my Buddhist/academic skeptic's guns here -- it's all illusion. No matter. Never mind. /gallumphs madly towards the Land of Paradox, only to be distracted by Pair-o'-Socks
• It's bees! How we missed you!
• Welcome back yon traveller!
• bees!!! Welcome back! Very interesting links, thanks Chy and Abiezer, much to ponder.
• I missed you guys, too -- I seem to beeee addicted to this place. bee-sotted
• Appellated as a fence sustained inquiry seated Pyrrhonian Skeptic's nomenclure and derision is defeated. (tic)
• Tra la, lets return to nature and cherish this new gnome-in-glacier! I am as apple aided as hard cider and interwebby as a tiddly spider. Ah, can I bee fitting to discurse? Or khan tribute another line that's worse?
• In verily, but I am undone! 'swacked and unzipped by gnomic oration. bee-twattled and bee-devilled, hived off by ribald prosody to a mere tributary.
• What kind of skepticism is this?
• What kind of skepticism is this? Falls into the skepticism of UFO's, contrails and Edgar Cayce.
• There is a fairly influential school of Descartes scholarship that sees the Meditations as an attempt to rebut the Pyrrhonians. You get shades of this interpretation in Philosophy 110 classes, even if you never hear Pyrrhonian skepticism mentioned specifically. I think this is at best an incomplete view; others will argue against that. But I think it's fair to say that, whatever Descartes' intentions, he did a lot to establish foundationalism as a viable metaphysical and epistemological position and in so doing drove a stake through the heart of Pyrrhonian skepticism with the Meditations. I suppose it's possible to see the contemporary debate over foundationalism as a sequel to the debate between the Pyrrhonians and the Cartesians. There are, however, a number of differences. Statements like "most scientists seem to be Pyrrhonians" are simplistic at best. I think to argue this is so would be to ignore Kuhnian observations about the sociology of science.
• s/b "To argue that most scientists are Pyrrhonians would be to ignore Kuhn."
• And now I remember why I like being an academic skeptic so much. It's less Kuhn-fusing.
• The problem with being a Pyrrhonian Skeptic is that if you ever think you're right, you're wrong. Except when you're not. And likely very few people can sort that out.
• I thought everything was going well until Smo brought a cogent, well-laid out position based on knowledge of the issues into it. That always does for me.
• It's less Kuhn-fusing. Maybe this will help clear things up a bit (and it will me to study this stuff). Foundationalism is the idea that there are certain pillars upon which we can lay our knowledge. These pillars are supposed to be indestructible. The Pyrrhonian skeptics denied foundationalism. Descartes' Meditations tends to be read as an attempt to lay these foundations and thus as an attempt to refute the Pyrrhonians. This is due to the First Meditation. In it, he says that many of his former opinions subsequently revealed themselves to be false. The stick under water that, to the eye, appears bent is the classic example; another is the sun, which from earth looks like the size of a quarter. In light of these examples, he says it would be best to demolish all of his previous opinions that could admit themselves of the least doubt. He does his best to formulate skeptical possibilities: that our senses are wrong; that we're all dreaming; that there exists an evil genius who makes truth impossible for us. With these matrix-like (Pyrrhonian) scenarios in hand as possibilities, he claimed that only a few facts could be counted as certain. These facts, if they are to count as certain, could be ascertained only by "clear and distinct perception." One of them is the cogito: I think therefore I am. Even the Pyrrhonian could not deny his own existence. Another is the existence of God, who turns out to be perfect and good and therefore not a deceiver. The arguments for God are complex, but suppose he is correct and they demonstrate God exists. How does this help him? Well, if God exists and he is not a deceiver, then he wouldn't make us such that, even when we did our best, we were led to make false judgments. "Doing our best," for Descartes, is "clear and distinct perception," which I mentioned above. This too is a complicated concept, but suffice it to say Descartes believed that these perceptions, properly understood, could not be false. And he believed that this gave him the means to get all sorts of knowledge. As an aside, this is where people accuse Descartes of allegedly arguing in a circle: the infamous Cartesian Circle. The argument looks circular from the way I described it -- C&D perception gets him God; God gets him C&D perception -- and it looks that way to most people when they first read the Meditations. I think this charge is unfair, and most Descartes scholars would agree with me, but the issue is very complex. Anyway, the wild matrix-like possibilities may or may not be a big deal to you. If so, you might be incined toward Pyrrhonian skepticism. Some people will argue that they were a big deal for Descartes, that this is what the Meditations was about. I think Descartes' skepticism in the Meditations is more plausibly read as a cover for him to deny the Aristotelian physics of his time so he could supplant them with his own. Because the Scholastics of the day more or less accepted Aristotle as the ultimate authority on these matters, Descartes needed a way to advance what were at the time radical views. Pyrrhonian skepticism gave him the pretext upon which he could dismiss Aristotle without actually angering anyone (because none of the Scholastics were especially worried about Pyrrhonianism). This too is up for debate. The literature is less decisive on this. Regardless, Descartes succeeded in establishing his physics. The world of science is thoroughly Cartesian in how it talks about perception and the senses. Partly for this reason, for a long time, a lot of people thought he succeeded in his foundationalist project. Think of it as a halo effect: he was right about his physics so he was probably right about the anti-Pyrrhonian stuff, right?
• Today, anti-foundationalism is the dominant position in academia today, even if just about everyone is in some sense a Cartesian with respect to physics. Now, I think you can cut God out of the Cartesian picture, insert evolution, and retain "clear and distinct perception" as a means to near-certain knowledge. God gives you certainty; evolution gives you something very close to it. Either way, this doesn't keep me up at night. But some people will argue that this is a big deal for atheists and agnostics. It should keep us up at night! Descartes argued this (perhaps purely to avoid the sort of troubles Galileo ran into). Others who are less sympathetic to Cartesian philosophy argue that foundationalism of any sort is misguided, a waste of time, regardless of whether or not God exists. There are no protected truths upon which we can build our knowledge; or, if there are, these truths don't get as anywhere. So it looks like we're stuck with Pyrrhonian skepticism as a viable position. UFOs, ghosts, unicorns -- it seems best to reserve judgment about these, the Pyrrhonian would say. This is, you might argue, how science works: hypotheses are formed; they are tested; and if they pass, they are accepted as theories. Without a workable theory, scientists withhold assent. To assent to propositons without evidence either way would be to accept dogma. Except this isn't how science works. Kuhn showed, among other things, that scientists take a great deal on faith. In practice, at least, authority in science is at least as important as data. It's rather remarkable, actually, how much scientists rely on others' data. Not to mention that it's flat-out wrong to assert that most scientists avoid pronouncements on things like UFOs, ghosts, unicorns, and other similar nonsense. Hardly anyone of intellectual maturity in these matters does (that, for example, roughly 50% of the American population believes in ghosts is a sad commentary about that 50%, and not at all evidence that the proposition is reasonable). Much more could be said about this, but I'm less familar with the terrain so I'll leave it at that.
• Hermes: ...any bids for this one? Buyer: Yes, me. But tell me first, what do you know? Pyrrhias: Nothing. Buyer: How do you mean, nothing? Pyrrhias: I don't think there is anything at all. Buyer: Aren't we something? Pyrrhias: I'm not even sure of that. Buyer: Not even that you're somebody? Pyrrhias: I'm much more doubtful still about that. Buyer: What a state to be in! Well, what's the idea of those scales? Pyrrhias: I weigh arguments in them. I balance them until they're equal, and when I see they're exactly alike and exactly the same weight, then - ah, then! - I don't know which is sounder... Lucian, The Sale of the Philosophers
• I've been a card-carrying Skeptic for a number of years, but I admit with shame that I've never really invested the time in contemplating what form of philosophy underpins my personal perception / application of Skepticism. I suspect that like many people with no formal background in philosophy, my model for Skepticism is loosely built on fragments stolen from several schools of philosophical thought, all of which makes for a deliciously contradictory melange of perceptions and beliefs. I think it may be time for me to hie me over to Wikipedia and points-elsewhere to see if I can bring some coherence to the pea soup sloshing around inside my brain.
• So, if I understand correctly, a Pyrrhonian rejects all answers, even the correct one.
• It sounds to me that Pyrrhonians have the problem of being open minded to a fault. From the article: "Our position is not doubt or denial or disbelief, but continual inquiry. For example, We do not believe in the reality of a god, but neither do we deny it." This position is not really practical. There are plenty of questions to which I don't know the answer and that are not worth my time investigating. Is there a category for pragmatic skepticism? How many gods do I have to not believe in before it's okay for me to not believe in any gods?
• I am a Pyrrhic Skeptic. One more rational victory like that and I'll be insane.
• Is there a category for pragmatic skepticism? If there isn't, then I think you just invented one. Monkeyfilter: the home of pragmatic skepticism.
• So, if I understand correctly, a Pyrrhonian rejects all answers, even the correct one. From what I've read so far, I'd guess you'd get a damn good argument over what exactly constitutes "correct".
• Many of these questions are of a binary nature..i.e. the answer is either yes or no. One of them *is* true, or correct, even if we don't know (or don't accept) which.
• Pfft. The law of the excluded middle is for little bitch-pantses. Insert some mindless rubbish about eating a magic peanut and turning into Britain's rarest ant, swear a bit, wrap it up with the usual malapropisms, yada yada.
• Oops! Looks like I hit "post comment" too early. Well, you get the idea of what I was going to say. I can't even be bothered anymore.
• I think the Cartesian arguments against Pyrrhonian thought are an overly extended hatchet job. Clearly, standing in front of the oncoming bus creates a verifiable legitimate outcome that we don't have to retest personally, and I doubt if Pyrrho suggested standing in front of the Ox cart in the thoroughfare because of his doubt of its reality. This sounds like the criticism created by a pedantic fool, and to be frank, I always found Cartesian thought tiresome. Descartes couldn't even come up with a solution for the Cartesian gap. As far as I'm concerned, that's it for Descartes, and scientific materialism is with me. As far as Pyrrhonian skepticism is concerned, it is preferable to religious skepticism, which imho is belief looking for supporting proof rather than open minded inquiry disregarding prejudice. I would equate Pyrrhonian skepticism in modern terms with Fortean study, where various outlandish concepts are entertained, but none *believed* - the phenomenon of belief itself being the centre of inquiry. Now send me money.
• "Britain's rarest ant" Don't be fuckin' saying anything against Toby, he's my best friend!
• I actually saw the room they are going to breed Britain's rarest ant in, at London Zoo last week.
• Toby? How could he be so.. unfaithful!!!??
• Guess you're not the only bugfucker in his life.
• Whilst a life-long Pyrrhonian Skeptic, one has but dabbled on the banks of philosophy and thus knew not it's name. Chyren has thoroughly eased my former uneasy suspicion that dedication to a life of open minded inquiry might just be my excuse for "sitting on the fence." Once again, I salute thee Chyren, oh sage! (No onions) In passing (vis Cartesian thought) Bertrand Russell pointed out that "People wish the universe good, and will be lenient to bad arguments proving this to be so, while bad arguments proving that it is bad are closely scanned!"
• You don't ever want to serve on a jury with a Pyrrhonian skeptic.
• Thanks Smo, them's some of the finest postin' I seen in a long time on this-a-here filter. And thanks Chy, for a great FPP. I was with Descartes up until the God thing, but then it kinda lost me. Looking into "the Cartesian gap" bit now. FWIW, A Pyrrhic victory is so called after the Greek king Pyrrhus, who, after suffering heavy losses in defeating the Romans in 279 B.C., said to those sent to congratulate him, "Another such victory over the Romans and we are undone." Which I also didn't know.
• Clearly, standing in front of the oncoming bus creates a verifiable legitimate outcome... and I doubt if Pyrrho suggested standing in front of the Ox cart in the thoroughfare because of his doubt of its reality. In which case, what is Pyrrhonian skepticism? It seems to me that it becomes either disingenuous or, more generously, practically useless. If the latter, what's the point? Descartes couldn't even come up with a solution for the Cartesian gap. As far as I'm concerned, that's it for Descartes, and scientific materialism is with me. Cartesian dualism is most certainly false. But the mind-body mumbo-jumbo can be separated from the rest of his philosophy; it has little to do with his epistemology or the rest of his physics, and, minus the dualism and some other stuff, we all accept the latter. His claims about certainty and truth are not part of that package. As far as Pyrrhonian skepticism is concerned, it is preferable to religious skepticism, which imho is belief looking for supporting proof rather than open minded inquiry disregarding prejudice. Unpack this a bit. If you're saying that religious skepticism is ad hoc, it sounds like you're making a psychological claim about its adherents' motives. If that's the case, I would agree with you, but only in some cases, and that's only a belief of mine -- a belief that I cannot prove because I don't have access to others' motives. But if you're saying that this means religious skepticism is untenable, then, no, that doesn't follow. That would be to argue that the genesis of a belief demonstrates its falsity, and that's fallacious. Powerful arguments, based on certain assumptions, can be made against the viability of a belief in the existence of a personal God and the supernatural in general. Personally, I find these arguments persuasive, so I am comfortable saying something like this: "I am reasonably certain that a personal God does not exist and that supernatural beliefs are hooey." I don't reserve judgment. I make a judgment. I can imagine that I might be wrong, but I don't think I am. I would equate Pyrrhonian skepticism in modern terms with Fortean study, where various outlandish concepts are entertained, but none *believed* Descartes' point on this is that certain outlandish concepts not only should not be believed, but they should not be entertained because they cannot be entertained, unless we take leave of our other faculties. For example, it might be the case that I can entertain the evil genius hypothesis as a logical possibility, but this does not mean I ought to believe it, or even reserve judgment. Descartes argued that when I turn my attention away from the mere possibility, I can no longer seriously believe it. It is therefore up to the skeptic to present arguments for his hypotheses. Logical possibilities are not arguments. This is why I say people who believe in ghosts, unicorns, etc. without evidence are intellectually immature, and people who entertain them as possibilities without a reason to do so aren't much better. A friend of mine, who rejects God for the same reasons I do, is convinced by all sorts of conspiracy theories. This drives me nuts. Of course it's logically possible I might be wrong and he might be right. Anyway, the point is, when the Pyrrhonian says "nothing can be known," by her own standard, she might be wrong about that too and thus should avoid judgment, no?
• There are school of epistemology that hold that, strictly speaking, "truth" does not exist; or, if say it does, truth sits relative to our purposes. This is a position I agree with, but I take it that Pyrrhonian skepticism says something stronger than that. And that's where I demur. Your mileage may vary.
• Language began as a tool of (more) efficient communication, courtesy of homo sapient physiology, including a ‘highly developed’ pre-frontal cortex. This grants the ability to create complex language forms and idioms, variations of which are developed to describe objects and ideas within different specialties. Language forms may then be used as a means by which some of those particular tribal groups can adopt an elite position within (a) society, and/or to define an exclusive or separate position. These exclusive tribal groups may then grant membership to individuals based upon their ability to grasp the specific forms of stylized language in use within that tribal group before other qualifiers. Evolution, and tribal groups grant their members an acceptance of --- “In practice, at least, authority in science is at least as important as data. It's rather remarkable, actually, how much scientists rely on others' data.” It is? Well, perhaps it is, to scientists! Facetiously, Cartesian Skepticism strolls by in determined uncertainty, Epistemic Skepticism has empiricism rolling in dogmatic persistence, and Pyrrhonian Skeptics are either/or, maybe or whatever the case may be, and until further data is available. I forget the joke but the punch-line is “how do it know?” and it has it’s point here. “If ah aint seen it bruthah , an ah aint heeard it’s a-mohaaanin’, then it aint nohow, nowhere!” Smo’s discourse appears to issue from one who has determined a philosophical position from an intrinsic personal inclination, rather than (just) from a course of reasoned inquiry. Whilst Smo may consider his position to be valid, given an undoubted erudition, and an expertise in debate, it does expose a certain intellectual tribalism while nose-diving into the frame of Bertrand Russell’s comment (as posted above). We might note that the word ‘belief’ is often used in place of the word ‘judgment’ by those unfamiliar with the ‘art of the dialectic’. Stap me and baste me like a spleen Jean, be accurate dearie! When we hear the words “personally” and “persuasive”, coupled with the words “reasonably” and “judgment,” one vibrates in sympathy with the bonging of mental alarm bells as we recognize an intellectual tribal member using language to obfuscate rather than illuminate. The intellectual tribal member has risen to a position where he/she is the possessor of “scientific authority” and is thus justified in expressing a certain lofty and benign irritation with those who maintain ‘unreasonable beliefs’ in opposition to his or her ‘reasoned judgment’ where he or she ”.. can imagine I might be wrong, but I don’t think I am.” It is logically impossible to be free of ego and still live, (or so I believe.. heh) “Truth” is said to be subjective, “fact” to be objective. Given that all individual persons are “material subject to tides” may we conclude this to be “fact”? Hmm, more data required! Des cartes is behind de Horkheimer and it makes it’s Marx, dammit! Ultimately one defers to Douglas Adams, and "The Hitch-Hiker's Guide To The Galaxy” in which the character Slartibartfast introduces the most 'macro' of controlled scientific experiment, the earth! The experiment is designed to answer the question; "What is the meaning of Life, the Universe and Everything?" A work still in progress methinks!
• My mind is very much energised by Smo's arguments, and I respectfully ask for time to meditate upon these highly intellectually delectable concepts before responding. It has been some time since I have enjoyed such discussion.. I am happy, since I only posted this link on a whim. In fact, I feel as if I have awakened.. only to know that I still am sleeping.
• I want to stress that I don't think the existence of God (for example) is an unreasonable proposition. Many, many reasonable people disagree with me, people who have spent more time thinking about these things than I have. Plus, a lot of intolerance and stupidity springs from the belief that one is infallible. See George W. Bush for an example. All I want to argue with respect to the God question is that I can have a belief -- even a reasonably certain one -- about the issue without access to pure, "objective" truth (whatever that means, if it exists, etc.). My lack of access to a truly objective viewpoint doesn't make my belief as a belief foolish. To claim otherwise would be to make all beliefs foolish. And no one really believes that, not even a Pyrrhonian. Smo’s discourse appears to issue from one who has determined a philosophical position from an intrinsic personal inclination, rather than (just) from a course of reasoned inquiry. I'm not sure what to say to this. I think truth is relative on a deep, deep level. But at the same time, it makes no sense to me to entertain bizarre hyotheses willy-nilly without a reason to do so. As I think Descartes showed in the Meditations, we can only do this when we ignore, rather than pay attention to, our reasoning. Anyway, I've written way more than I wanted to about this. If Chy or someone wants to keep it going, I'll step aside for a while and maybe respond in a couple days.
• great goddlemighty loves the bee and makes him flighty
• Wonderful thread. This old MeFi post may also be of interest. Nussbaum's book, The Therapy of Desire, is brilliant.
• homunculus, you might be interested in this collection (it includes one of Nussbaum's essays on disgust, as well as a nice rebuttal of her view). I happen to be nearing the end of a seminar class on the emotions in law and morality and, along with the older Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions, I find almost all of the essays in that book fascinating. The price tag is reasonable to boot.